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## MY NEGOTIATIONS WITH GENERAL SHERMAN.

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WHEN General Lee was appointed General-in-Chief, late in the winter of 1865, a large number of Members of Congress, including Senator Wigfall of Texas (who is my authority for the statement), urged the President to replace me in the military service. This was done by the following telegrams, received together :

RICHMOND, *February 22, 1865.*

GENERAL J. E. JOHNSTON : The Secretary of War directs that you report by telegraph to General R. E. Lee, Petersburg, Va.

(Signed)

S. COOPER, Adj. and Inspt. General.

HEAD-QUARTERS, *February 22, 1865.*

GENERAL J. E. JOHNSTON : Assume command of the Army of Tennessee and all troops in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. Assign General Beauregard to duty under you as you may select. Concentrate all available forces and drive back Sherman.

(Signed)

R. E. LEE.

Mr. Davis explains (vol. ii., page 631) that he assented to this assignment "with the understanding that General Lee would supervise and control the operations." This evidently is a mistake. It has been known, since the first military organization, that no one absent from an army can "control its operations."

After learning that this assignment was not disagreeable to General Beauregard, I accepted it, with no other hope than that of contributing to obtain favorable terms of peace ; the only one that a rational being could then entertain. For the result of the war was evident to the dullest, although General Lee's matchless skill and resolution were still maintaining his position against the great Federal power.

The troops placed under my control that might be united to oppose General Sherman's forces, which were not less than 65,000 (instead of being 30,500, as Mr. Davis asserts), amounted, when

concentrated at Bentonville, to not more than 18,500, including 4,000 cavalry. The cavalry, under General Hampton, was observing the march of the Federal army, and harassing it as much as possible. The infantry was in four bodies, at long distances from each other: Hardie's troops, hurrying from Charleston toward Cheraw (6,500 of whom crossed the Cape Fear); Hoke's division of above 5,000, near Goldsboro'; and 3,950 of the army of Tennessee at Charlotte and Goldsboro', under Generals Stewart, D. H. Hill, and Stevenson.

The Federal army was moving from Winnsboro' toward Cheraw, in two columns, occasionally half a day's march apart, and within the quadrilateral at the angles of which were the four bodies of Confederate troops.

My immediate object was to unite these four bodies in front of one of General Sherman's columns, in the hope of attacking it to advantage by striking its head. My ultimate object was to join General Lee when he should abandon Richmond, so that he might fall upon Sherman with our united forces. Later on, however, I learned from him that he could only leave his position by marching to the West. As General Sherman's course from Cheraw made it uncertain whether he would take the road through Raleigh, or that through Goldsboro', the troops of the Army of Tennessee were directed to Smithfield, intermediate between the two routes. With about 1,800 of these troops, under General D. H. Hill, and Hoke's division, General Bragg attacked a much superior force under General J. D. Cox near Kinston, on the 8th of March. The enemy was driven from the field, and pursued by Generals Hill and Hoke with their accustomed vigor. But General Bragg stopped the pursuit. General Cox halted in the first good position, which he intrenched. General Bragg attacked him in it, on the 10th, and was easily repulsed—so easily that his loss in men and material was trifling. But the prestige of victory was left to the enemy, in exchange for the 1,500 prisoners and three field-pieces they lost on the 8th. In action with the left Federal column, General Hardie lost about 500 men, inflicting upon the enemy at least an equal loss.

On the march, encounters of cavalry were frequent. In all those reported to me, General Hampton had the advantage.

From Fayetteville, General Sherman's right column took the direct road to Goldsboro', and the other that by Averysboro'. The

Confederate forces, assembled near Bentonville, attacked this column on the 19th of March, drove it from the field and pursued it a mile, into woods and thickets so dense as to stop the pursuit, by making order and control impossible.

Although all the Federal forces were united before us next morning, we held our position that day and the next against five times our number and were able to carry off our wounded—which was a very slow operation, as we had no ambulances and very few wagons. This action had a happy effect upon our troops and the neighboring people.

General Sherman writes of this action (page 305, vol. ii.) that Johnston's army struck the head of Slocum's column, knocking back Carlin's division ; but when the rest of the Fourteenth and the Twentieth corps came up he repulsed all of Johnston's attacks. This is a mistake. The Federal troops began the action ; making two attacks, each of half an hour's duration. Both attacks were repelled. After these repulses, at about 3 P.M., the Confederate troops assailed the Federals and drove them from the field, which ended the fighting, excepting an occasional Federal cannon-shot. He reports the Confederate loss as four to three, compared with the Federal, although the former had the advantage in all the fighting, and in most of it were covered by breastworks. The statement that the right wing buried 100 Confederates and took 1,287 prisoners is inconsistent with the fact that its men were fully exposed and that ours were under shelter, nor did his men approach our position until the 22d—hours after it had been evacuated. And, again, only 653 of our men were missing at the end of the affair.

General Sherman had a great accession to his forces at Goldsboro' ; where he remained until the 10th of April. The Confederate troops were in bivouac during that time—a day's march north-west.

On the 5th, the press dispatches informed us that General Lee had abandoned the lines he had been holding with such admirable courage and conduct.

On the 10th, the Federal army commenced its march toward Raleigh. The Confederate troops moved in the same direction. Having the advantage of a day's march, they reached Raleigh the next afternoon, when I received, by telegraph, orders to report to the President at Greensboro' without delay.

I reached the station there early in the morning of the 12th,

and was General Beauregard's guest in the box-car in which he lodged. It was conveniently near the President's quarters. His Excellency sent for us in an hour or two. We found him with three members of his Cabinet—Messrs. Benjamin, Mallory, and Reagan. We were told that General Breckenridge was on his way from Virginia, and that Mr. George Davis was unwell. We had supposed that the President wished to obtain information from us of the military condition of that department, but it soon appeared that we were to receive, not to give information. For those present were told, with very little preface, that, in two or three weeks, the President would have in the field a larger army than the Confederacy ever had in its ranks at one time, by calling out the many thousands who had abandoned the service, and all those enrolled by the conscript bureau, who could not be brought into it by the military force used for the purpose by that bureau. It was suggested that men who had left the army when our cause was not desperate, and those who under similar circumstances could not be forced into it, would scarcely return to it, or enter it, in its present hopeless condition, upon a mere invitation. The fact that we had not arms enough for the soldiers who stood by their colors made this scheme inexpressibly wild. But no opinions were asked and we were dismissed. Before leaving the room, we were told that General Breckenridge's arrival that evening was certain, and that he was expected to bring positive intelligence of the fate of the Army of Virginia.

General Breckenridge came as expected, and reported that General Lee had capitulated on the 9th. After this intelligence, General Beauregard and I carefully considered the state of our affairs. We found ourselves compelled to admit that the military resources of the South were exhausted, and that the Confederacy was overthrown. Subsequently, in conversation with General Breckenridge, I endeavored to convince him of this fact, and represented that the President had but one power of government left in his hands—that of terminating hostilities—which it was his duty to exercise by making peace without delay. I offered to suggest to him the necessity of immediately opening negotiations to arrange the terms of peace between the two sections, should an opportunity be given me. He promised to make one for me next morning.

Later in the evening Mr. Mallory found me, and sought to con-

vince me of the necessity of the course that I had endeavored to impress upon General Breckenridge, and desired me to urge upon the President the need of doing promptly all in his power to end the war. This he thought peculiarly the duty of the ranking military officer. After maintaining that it belonged rather to his constitutional advisers, I told him of the agreement made with General Breckenridge.

General Beauregard and I were summoned to the President's quarters next morning (the 13th); I supposed at General Breckenridge's suggestion. We were desired to compare the military condition of the Confederacy with that of the United States. As spokesman, I said that we had an army of 20,000 \* infantry and artillery, and 5,000† mounted troops; against which the United States could bring three: that in Virginia of 180,000, as we were informed; that in North Carolina of 110,000, and that in Alabama of 60,000, making odds against us of at least fifteen to one. Then we had neither money nor credit, and no arms except those in the hands of our soldiers, nor ammunition excepting that in their cartridge-boxes, nor shops to repair arms or fix ammunition; and that therefore the only effect of our keeping the field would be the devastation of our country and the ruin of the people, and this, too, without inflicting harm on the enemy. I asserted further that it would be the highest of human crimes to continue the war. General Beauregard assented decidedly to this view.

The members of the Cabinet were then desired by the President to express their opinions as to the possibility of our continuing the war. General Breckenridge and Messrs. Mallory and Reagan concurred with the military officers—that we had been overcome in arms, and that it was necessary to make peace. But Mr. Benjamin entertained the opposite opinion, which he asserted in a speech enthusiastically warlike.

The President then remarked that it was idle to suggest to him negotiation with the Government of the United States, for it was known, from the result of an attempt that he had lately made, that no terms offered by him would be considered, nor would his authority to treat be acknowledged by Mr. Lincoln. I reminded him that, as he knew from his military reading, peace had been occasionally established by the generals of belligerent powers agreeing upon general terms, which, accepted by the two governments, became

\* 18,500 actually. † 2,400 only.

the basis of treaties. I suggested that he should permit me to propose negotiations for that object to General Sherman. Mr. Davis opposed this idea; but, in arguing against it, he brought himself to assent to the first plan—that he should propose negotiation to Mr. Lincoln. He sketched a letter appropriate to be addressed by me to General Sherman, asking him to meet me to arrange the terms of an armistice, to enable the civil authorities to agree upon terms of permanent peace. I urged that this course should be taken at once, by his dictating this letter to Mr. Mallory, who was a good penman, and my signing and sending it to General Sherman. It was prepared immediately, and was in these words:

“The results of the recent campaign in Virginia have changed the relative military condition of the belligerents. I am therefore induced to address you, in this form, the inquiry whether, in order to stop the further effusion of blood and devastation of property, you are willing to make a temporary suspension of active operations, and to communicate to General Grant, commanding the Armies of the United States, the request that he will take like action in regard to other armies, the object being to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war.”

This letter was immediately dispatched to General Hampton, commanding the Confederate cavalry (who was near Hillsboro’), to be forwarded by him to General Sherman—to whom it was delivered on the 14th.

I left Greensboro’ that evening to rejoin the army, which was marching from Raleigh toward Greensboro’.

In the morning of the 16th, near Greensboro’, I received General Sherman’s assent to the proposed meeting. Supposing that the President was waiting in Greensboro’ to be ready to negotiate should General Sherman agree to the armistice, I went to the town to obtain any instructions he might have for me. There I learned that Mr. Davis was on his way to Charlotte. So, after requesting General Hampton by telegraph to arrange the time and place of meeting, I went to his head-quarters, a few miles east of Hillsboro’. There he informed me that the meeting was to be at noon of the 17th, on the Raleigh road, at a house midway between the pickets of the two armies.

The meeting occurred, as appointed, at the house of a Mr. Bennett. As soon as the door of the room assigned us was closed, and we without witnesses, General Sherman showed me a telegram which he said was brought by a courier who overtook him after he

left the railroad station. It was from Mr. Stanton, announcing the assassination of the President of the United States. I remarked, after reading the dispatch, that no greater misfortune could have befallen the South than that event.

From his account of this interview, it is evident that General Sherman's memory confounds, I think, occurrences in Raleigh with those in Mr. Bennett's house. The idea that the Confederates could be suspected of such a crime never entered my mind, and the amount of sensibility ascribed to me is unnatural; nor is General Sherman capable of the rudeness of speaking to me in such terms of my President as he attributes to himself. He informed me that an armistice to give opportunity for negotiation by the two governments would be useless, because the Government of the United States did not acknowledge the existence of a Southern Confederacy, and, consequently, it could not recognize any civil officers authorized to make treaties, and, therefore, he could not transmit or receive any proposition to the President of the United States by one calling himself President of the Southern Confederacy. But, after expressing, with an air and manner carrying conviction of sincerity, an earnest wish to avert from the Southern people the devastation inevitable from war, General Sherman offered me such terms as those of Appomattox Court House. I replied that General Lee's capitulation was unavoidable; but that, in my position, the armies being four days' march apart, it could be easily avoided; and I proposed that, instead of a suspension of hostilities, we should agree upon general terms of pacification, as our official positions empowered us to do, and as other generals had done; quoting among other precedents the termination of the war in 1797 by General Bonaparte and the Archduke Charles, the overtures having been made by the victorious general—Bonaparte. On my repeating Bonaparte's sentiment, that if his overtures should save the life of one man, he would value the civic crown so won above any honor merely military, General Sherman evidently, as he said, appreciated that sentiment, and added that to put an end to bloodshed and devastation, and restore the Union, and with it the prosperity of the South, were objects of ambition to him. He regarded joint resolutions of Congress, and proclamations by the President of the United States, as proving conclusively that the restoration of the Union was the object of the war, and he believed that the men of the Union army had been



fighting for that object. A long conversation with Mr. Lincoln at City Point, but a short time before, impressed upon him the opinion that the President then so considered it.

In a short time we agreed upon the terms as written out by General Sherman on the 18th, excepting that he would not consent to include Mr. Davis in the amnesty clause. The afternoon was consumed in efforts to dispose of this question in a manner that would be satisfactory to the Southern President and Southern people. No conclusion had been reached at sunset, when the discussion was suspended, to be resumed at ten o'clock next morning.

On returning to General Hampton's quarters, I telegraphed to General Breckenridge, Secretary of War, to join me, in the hope that his confidential relations with Mr. Davis might enable him to suggest terms satisfactory to the President and people. General Breckenridge and Mr. Reagan came to General Hampton's quarters early next morning. I explained to them the subjects of the discussion between General Sherman and myself the day before, the terms proposed, and the only one not agreed to—that including the Confederate President in the clause giving general amnesty. I stated that I desired assistance of the Secretary of War in making that clause a satisfactory one. Mr. Reagan asked if the terms discussed had been reduced to writing. I replied that they had not. He proposed to write them out. With that object I carefully repeated them to him.

As the United States acknowledged only the military officers of the Confederacy, General Breckenridge and I rode to the place of meeting without Mr. Reagan.

When we met, I explained to General Sherman my reason for asking General Breckenridge's presence, and asked his admission as a major-general, not as Secretary of War, to which he assented. I then presented to General Sherman, as my proposition, the terms discussed the day before, as written out by Mr. Reagan, which included general amnesty, and reminded him that he had already accepted all but one clause. After listening to General Breckenridge, who addressed him six or eight minutes in advocacy of these terms, General Sherman, with my paper before him, wrote very rapidly the agreement which we signed, and which follows. He wrote so rapidly that I was convinced that he had decided to agree to these terms before coming to the meeting. His paper only differs from mine in style, and the addition of the

article to establish the Federal courts, which seemed to me superfluous.

The terms agreed upon were:

1. The contending armies now in the field to maintain the *statu quo*, until notice is given by the commanding general of any one to its opponent, and reasonable time—say, forty-eight hours—allowed.

2. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and conducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their arms and public property in the State Arsenal; and each officer and man to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and to abide the action of the State and Federal authority. The number of arms and munition of war to be reported to the Chief of Ordnance at Washington City, subject to the future action of the Congress of the United States, and, in the meantime, to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the States respectively.

5. The people and inhabitants of all the States to be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, their political rights and franchises, as well as their rights of person and property, as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.

6. The Executive authority of the Government of the United States not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace and quiet, abstain from acts of armed hostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their residence.

7. In general terms—the war to cease; a general amnesty, so far as the Executive of the United States can command, on condition of the disbandment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of the arms, and the resumption of peaceful pursuits by the officers and men hitherto composing said armies. Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfill these terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain the necessary authority, and to carry out the above programme.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General,

Commanding Army of the United States in North Carolina.

J. E. JOHNSTON, General,

Commanding Confederate States Army in North Carolina.

Four copies were made, one for each President, and one for each signer. General Sherman then returned to his army and I to mine; and each of us announced, publicly, the suspension of hostilities.

Soon after my arrival at Greensboro', Colonel Archer Anderson, adjutant-general of the army, delivered to me two notes, of different dates, from the President. In the first I was informed that the sum of \$39,000, in silver, subject to my order, was in the hands of the Treasury Agent, Mr. J. N——; which I was directed to use as the military chest of the army. In the

other, which was of later date, I was directed to send this money to him in Charlotte. As the faithful soldiers around me had been without pay many months, and were in great need of money, I thought and felt that its best use would be its distribution among them without regard to rank—generals and privates sharing equally, the sick in hospitals being included. The sum divided was \$37,800 ; \$1,200 having been taken by the commissary-general. I also urged the Secretary of War, in writing, to procure the application of a portion of the specie in the possession of the Administration to the payment of a part of the very large arrears due the troops. The letter was carried by Colonel A. P. Mason, who was instructed to wait for an answer. One was promised by telegraph ; but it never came. Mr. Davis asserts (page 691, vol. ii.) that it is more than doubtful if he wrote the notes above mentioned. I assert that *he* does not doubt it. Colonel Anderson's evidence of the distribution of the silver proves that he wrote the first note, which he denies. His denial of the writing of that note invalidates his denial of the other. It was my duty, in such a case, as Mr. Davis well knows, to call the attention of the War Department to the great needs of the troops committed to me.

When I assumed command in North Carolina, there were very large supplies of provision for man and horse in the railroad depôts. But the War Department prohibited their use by the troops serving there, on the ground that they were necessary to the army before Richmond ; although those troops could not have consumed them in six or eight months. The wagons of the Army of Tennessee arrived in Augusta in the beginning of March ; and Colonel W. E. Moore, chief commissary of the army, was instructed to use one hundred of them to form a line of depôts between Washington, Ga., and Charlotte, for the general object of collecting supplies, and for the possible march of our troops along that line, should General Lee leave his position before Richmond. About the 20th of March, Colonel Moore reported that more than 700,000 rations had been collected in the fine depôts of the line. The meeting of General Sherman and myself on April 17th suggested, among the troops, the idea that peace was to be made, or that they were to be surrendered. So, many of them left the army to plant their crops, but many more to escape becoming prisoners of war. Such as could lay hands on them rode off with the horses and mules belonging to the batteries and trains.

In the afternoon of the 24th I received from the President, who was then in Charlotte, notice by telegraph that he had ratified the terms of pacification agreed upon by General Sherman and me on the 18th. Within an hour thereafter a courier brought me from General Hampton two communications from General Sherman—one giving notice of the rejection of the terms above mentioned by the President of the United States, and the other announcing the termination of the armistice forty-eight hours after noon of that day. These facts were communicated to the administration without delay; and I proposed that, to prevent further devastation of our country by the marching of armies, our army should be disbanded. A reply dated 11 P.M., April 24th, was received early next morning. It suggested that the infantry might be disbanded then, to re-assemble at a place named. I was directed to bring with me all the cavalry, a few light field-pieces, and all other men who could be mounted on serviceable beasts. I declined to obey this order; giving as my reason, that it provided for the performance of but one of the three important duties I had to perform—securing the safety of the President and Cabinet, but not that of the people and of the army, and I suggested the immediate escape of the high civil officers under a proper escort.

The confident belief that it would be a high crime to continue the war governed me in this instance, as it had prompted me to urge the civil authorities of the South to end the war.

The arrangement ordered would have put the great bodies of Union troops in motion, everywhere spreading suffering and ruin among our people, without serving the object of the President's escape as well as an escort of a few picked men would have done.

I determined, therefore, to make another effort to bring about a pacification—within the extent of my command, at least—in the confidence that it would spread fast to the West and South. In that hope I proposed another armistice to General Sherman, and another arrangement, on the basis of the military clause in the agreement of the 18th. General Sherman sent a favorable reply very promptly; so that I was able to set out early on the 26th to meet him at Bennett's, as before, after reporting to the Administration that I was about to do so.

My proposition to General Sherman had been reported to the President, or Secretary of War, when made to him.

We met at Mr. Bennett's about noon ; and, as General Sherman was anxious to restore tranquillity to the country, we soon agreed upon terms, and established peace within the limits of our commands, which were the same. We believed that they would produce a general pacification. They were :

1. All acts of war on the part of the troops under General Johnston's command to cease from this date.

2. All arms and public property to be deposited at Greensboro', and delivered to an ordnance officer of the United States Army.

3. Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate; one copy to be retained by the commander of the troops, and the other to be given to officer to be designated by General Sherman. Each officer and man to give his individual obligation in writing not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly released from this obligation.

4. The side-arms of officers, and their private horses and baggage, to be retained by them.

5. This being done, all the officers and men will be permitted to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United States authorities, so long as they observe their obligation and the laws in force where they may reside.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General,

Commanding United States Forces in North Carolina.

J. E. JOHNSTON, General,

Commanding Confederate Forces in North Carolina.

Approved:

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

#### SUPPLEMENTAL TERMS.

1. The field transportation to be loaned to the troops for their march to their homes, and for subsequent use in their industrial pursuits. Artillery horses may be used in field transportation if necessary.

2. Each brigade or separate body to retain a number of arms equal to one-seventh of its effective strength, which, when the troops reach the capitals of their States, will be disposed of as the general commanding the department may direct.

3. Private horses, and other private property of both officers and men, to be retained by them.

4. The commanding general of the Military Division of West Mississippi, Major-General Canby, will be requested to give transportation by water from Mobile or New Orleans to the troops from Arkansas and Texas.

5. The obligations of officers and soldiers to be signed by their immediate commanders.

6. Naval forces within the limits of General Johnston's command to be included in the terms of this convention.

J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General,

Commanding United States Forces in North Carolina.

J. E. JOHNSTON, General,

Commanding Confederate Forces in North Carolina.

General Sherman assured me that he would transfer from the department all the troops except a small number sufficient to maintain order. He did this by an order issued the next day. Several of the leading officers of his army accompanied General Sherman on this occasion, and their conversation made the clear impression on my mind that they regretted the rejection of the terms of the 18th.

I announced this pacification to the Governors of the States immediately concerned, by telegraph, as follows:

"The disaster in Virginia, the capture by the enemy of all our workshops for the preparation of ammunition and repairing of arms, the impossibility of recruiting our little army, opposed to more than ten times its number, or of supplying it except by robbing our own citizens, destroyed all hope of successful war. I have made, therefore, a convention with Major-General Sherman, to terminate hostilities in North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. I made this convention to spare the blood of this gallant little army, to prevent further sufferings of our people by the devastation and ruin inevitable from the marches of invading armies, and to avoid the crime of waging a hopeless war."

The general terms of agreement were published to the army on the 27th.

Before the Confederate army came to Greensboro', most of the provisions in depôt there had been wasted or consumed by fugitives from the Army of Virginia, or by the poor people of the neighborhood. That at Charlotte had been consumed by our cavalry encamped near by and stragglers. The depôts established in South Carolina had been emptied in like manner. The consumers, acting upon the opinion, probably, that as there was no longer a government, they might, as well as any others, divide this property, which was sorely needed by most of them.

The only means of feeding the troops on the way to their homes was by distribution of a little cloth and a stock of cotton-yarn to serve them in lieu of currency. But the quantity of these articles on hand was utterly inadequate. General Sherman, however, prevented the great suffering that otherwise would have occurred along the homeward routes of the troops by giving us 200,000 rations, on no other condition than our transporting this provision from the coast to our camps.

The business of preparing and signing the necessary papers was concluded on the 2d of May. They imposed on the members of the Confederate army an obligation not to take up arms against

the United States, and secured them the protection of the Government. The three corps, and as many little bodies of cavalry, were then ordered to march to their homes, each under its former commander. I took leave of those admirable soldiers, in Order No. 22.

“COMRADES : In terminating our official relations, I earnestly exhort you to observe faithfully the terms of pacification agreed upon, and to discharge the obligations of good and peaceful citizens, as well as you have performed the duties of thorough soldiers in the field. By such a course you will best secure the comfort of your families and kindred, and restore tranquillity to our country.

“You will return to your homes with the admiration of our people, won by the courage and noble devotion you have displayed in this long war. I shall always remember with pride the loyal support and generous confidence you have given me.

“I now part with you with deep regret, and bid you farewell with feelings of cordial friendship, and with earnest wishes that you may have hereafter all the prosperity and happiness to be found in the world.

“Official.

J. E. JOHNSTON, General.

“KINLOCK TALCONESS, A. A. G.”

The large bodies of Federal troops stationed in the South proved by their conduct that they regarded the restoration of the Union as the object of the war, and treated the people around them as fellow-citizens, as they would have done those of Northern States if stationed among them. This inspired in the South a more kindly feeling for the Northern people and the Federal Government than had existed for ten years before. For it was imagined that those who did not fight were still more friendly than the invaders of our country ; and a strong expectation grew that the Southern States would soon enter the Union.

Very few apprehended such “reconstruction” as that soon imposed.

The example of pacification set in North Carolina was followed quickly in the other military departments.

The report of an interview with Mr. Davis, published in the “Globe-Democrat” of St. Louis, about the middle of February, indicates that his memory has failed. For, according to it, he asserted that, on the 24th of April, 1865, immediately after he approved the agreement of April 18th and received intelligence of its rejection by the United States Government, he ordered me to execute a plan of his to prosecute the war, which I disobeyed, al-

though commanding a large army ; a part of which (36,000 men) was paroled at Greensboro'. The proofs that he was conscious, at that time, of his utter inability to wage war, are, that at Greensboro', April 13th, after discussing the subject with four of his cabinet and two generals, he agreed with five of the six, that the military resources of the Confederacy were exhausted, and the endeavor to obtain peace an absolute necessity. And then—on the 24th, the date of the disobeyed order—he ratified the terms of a convention based on the fact that he had not the power to continue the war ; and, but the day before, he wrote to Mrs. Davis in a tone and in terms of utter hopelessness. All the members of his cabinet advocated the ratification of the agreement of April 18th.

These letters have been published. As to my "large army," General Breckenridge testified that, on the 18th it had 14,770 men, and was rapidly diminishing. If Mr. Davis had projected war, he would not have ordered the disbanding of the infantry, who were far more important than cavalry. The object of the order was evidently to strengthen his cavalry guard. He asserted that I had the advantage in cavalry. I had but 1,000 left ; General Sherman nearly 6,000, and General Wilson, in Georgia, nearly 20,000, as they reported. As to the testimony of the numbers paroled, two-thirds of those mentioned by Mr. Davis were men who *ought* to have been in the ranks, but who had quitted them, and were eager to get the protection given by parole. They were like the 53,000 paroled under the same terms of pacification in South Carolina and Georgia.

JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON.